The tools your team installs are an attack path now, not only the code you ship. The Hacker News reported a trojanized version of Anthropic's official Claude Code extension pushed through the Cursor Marketplace as a legitimate update, attempting to install a persistent SSH backdoor. SecurityWeek reported PHP2Shell attacks rooting Palo Alto firewalls while failing against WordPress, with over 22.6 million exposed instances potentially affected by critical PHP flaws targeted for over a week. And WordPress shipped security update 7.1.4, fixing 22 vulnerabilities impacting millions of sites. Different targets, one shared lesson: an unreviewed update gets the same trust as code you wrote yourself. We inventory the extensions installed across a team, pin versions, and audit developer machines for leftover keys and access entries nobody added on purpose. That is days of work, not months. If you want to know where your team stands, message us and we will come back with cost and timeline within a day.
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